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Long before Independence, the theme on which Gandhiji wrote repeatedly, was the 
need to improve the status of Indian women.  He drew attention to the fact that the 
woman was ‘not only.... condemned to domestic slavery but when she goes out as a 
labourer to earn wages though she works harder than man she is paid less”.1  He 
emphasised the fact that women should not suffer from any disability or 
discrimination2 and drew attention to the fact that “what we are doing to our women 
and what we are doing to our untouchables recoils upon our heads with force 
thousand times multiplied”.3  These strongly worded views inevitably had their effect 
on the members of the Congress.  Pandit Nehru, who like Gandhiji believed in 
improving the status of women and integrating them in the development of the 
country, found it easy to have a special sub-committee in the National Planning 
Committee of which he was the Chairman, to report on the role of women in the 
Planned Economy.  He wanted the Sub-committee to examine the question of a 
woman’s role from every aspect - social, political, legal and economic. 
 
The draft Report of the Sub-committee however went beyond the expectations of the 
Congress members and even of Pandit Nehru.  Among their many 
recommendations, were those which wanted equal rights for women in the family, 
equal pay for women workers and protection for maternity, recognition of their 
economic role as housewives and also same standards of morality for both men and 
women.  Pandit Nehru fearing that most Congressmen in their heart of hearts did not 
really subscribe to the view that there should be equality between men and women 
and the latter should be given the same opportunity in the labour market, urged the 
Chairwoman of the Sub-committee to go slow.4 He urged caution because he felt the 
Report may not be accepted and explained that men had to be enlisted in the fight 
against male domination and not become hostile by too radical suggestions.5 One of 
the recommendations made in the Report had been that maternity benefit for women 
workers should in no way depend on their marital status and that must have been 
one of the recommendations which would not have been easily acceptable to the 
men.  That there should be an equal moral standard for men and women is a far cry 
and comes out clearly because even years after our country had become 
independent, a Government Department refused maternity benefit to a woman 
employee because she was not married.  Strong and immediate protest from the 
women’s groups made the Labour Ministry clarify that maternity benefit would be for 
all employees and would not depend on the marital status - a demand made as far 
back as 1939 by the Sub-committee of the National Planning Committee. 
 
Owing to Gandhiji’s repeated exhortations and Nehru’s commitment equality of 
sexes had already been included as a Fundamental Right in the Karachi Congress 
in 1931.6  There was no going back and therefore the first major document after 
Independence - the Constitution - affirmed that there would not only be Justice, 
social, Political and Economic for all citizens but there would be Equality of Status 
and Opportunity also.  This was “solemnly resolved by the People of India to secure 
for all its citizens (Preamble)”.  The Preamble, followed by Part 3 of the Constitution 
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dealing with Fundamental rights spelt out more clearly that not only equality of the 
sexes but there would be no discrimination inter alia on grounds of sex.  
Participating in the debate on prohibition of discrimination on grounds inter alia, of 
sex, Renuka Ray thought that this “fundamental right ... makes a tremendous 
difference and really does bring in equality...  This right is a justifiable fundamental 
right today enforceable through courts of law and if there are any laws ...  which 
remains as a contradiction...  will have to be overridden”.7 
 
Unfortunately her optimism was without any basis because being committed to 
ensuring constitutional equality was one thing and making it effective is totally 
different as it evident now.  Renuka Ray did not realise that the male bastion 
practising patriarchal values does not surrender so easily. 
 
Another factor which occurred during the debate and should have made those who 
are really committed to gender equality more vigilant was that there was no 
discussion when it came to the clauses dealing with sex equality and prohibition on 
grounds of sex except some light-hearted remarks.  Purnima Banerjee did point out 
that as women of India”  did not fail this land...  in the freedom of the country so in 
the preservation of this freedom she shall not fail”.8 She however showed her 
displeasure at the frivolous remarks of some of her colleagues and chided them by 
saying that “I would beg of my colleagues in this House ... not to deal with the 
subject with any levity or any lightness of spirit because we have to realise that 
women ... are standing upon a threshold of life”.9   
 
Renuka Ray’s optimism was belied when the clause regarding equal pay for equal 
work for both men and women was placed as a directive principle.  This meant that it 
was not justifiable and allowed the states as well as private employers to 
discriminate between men and women workers.  Equal pay for equal work is a 
concept of democratic societies which we in India claim to be, so there was no 
justification for the distinction regarding the work condition of men and women.  How 
the principle of equality and no discrimination was violated even by the states was 
documented by the Committee on the Status of Women in their Report Towards 
Equality.10 One example was the fixation of lower minimum wages for women 
workers irrespective of the work they did by the Andhra Pradesh Government in 
1069 where they were working for Tobacco, Zarda and Cigarettes.11 
 
This obvious gender inequality continued till the International Women’s Year in 1975 
when by an ordinance, equal remuneration was promulgated and became a law in 
the following year.  A hastily drawn legislation, it was inevitable that employers would 
not so easily give up their past practice of paying the women less.  As has been 
pointed out, they continued their discriminatory practices either by making 
distinctions between permanent and casual employees or making categorisation of 
jobs placing women in the lower category.  The critics of the equal pay doctrine even 
went to the extent of contending that equal pay for equal work is an abstract doctrine 
which cannot be enforced.  The Supreme Court strongly refuted this fallacious 
argument by categorically emphasising that the “principle of equal pay for equal work 
is not an abstract doctrine”.12  Also “the Preamble to the Constitution constitute India 
into a Sovereign  Socialist Democratic Republic.  Again the word ‘Socialist’ must 
mean something... it must at least mean ‘equal pay for equal work’”.13  But for more 
than two decades after the constitutional guarantee, payment to women workers 
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continued being lower.  The provisions of the Act were such that they did little to 
remedy the situation with even the trade unions passively accepting the position. 
 
The ineffectiveness of the law - Equal Remuneration Act - passed with a fanfare as 
an Ordinance in 1975 - was brought out by Chief Justice Poti of the Kerala High 
Court when he said in a case that though there is not much case law in India on the 
question of discrimination against women it is not “because there is no 
discrimination... but perhaps because women are reluctant to come to the courts to 
vindicate their rights”.  He added after this comment that he regretted the fact that 
“decisions of material consequences said to be in the so-called interests of women 
purporting to protect the position of women are generally taken not after consultation 
with representative bodies of women but unilaterally by the administrators most of 
whom carry with them the hang-over of the past - the past of male domination”.14  
Even the Government in amending the Act stated regretfully that the practice of 
paying women lower wages was continuing and therefore the Act was being 
amended to not only make punishments more stringent but give voluntary 
organisations apart from the inspecting staff the locus standi to file complaints 
regarding the violations of the Act.15 
 
Apart from being paid unequal wages for the same work done by women workers, 
another factor contributing to their subordinate position and the attitude of the 
employers to deal with it, is the harassment women suffer in their place of work.  In 
the early eighties, a commercial artist at the Directorate  General of Employment and 
Training was continuously  being harassed by one of her senior colleagues.  In spite 
of her complaints the Ministry did nothing about it.  She finally went to the Central 
Administrative Tribunal (CAT) to complain.  The tribunal was extremely critical of the 
manner in which the Labour Ministry had looked into the complaint and ordered a 
fresh inquiry within four months.  The Tribunal further added that the “redressal can 
be retributive and preventive so that violation of female modesty in office premises in 
the cause of duty is visited with punishment and future violations deterred.  “For a 
good measure in pin-pointing the callous attitude of the Ministry they added  “by not 
taking action, the Ministry had really become an accomplice”.16 
 
Under Pandit Nehru’s leadership, the Constituent Assembly members had been 
made to realise that more declaration of equality of sexes may not bring about the 
desired result.  It would often be necessary to make special provisions for them and 
therefore the Constitution.  Article 15 which prohibits discrimination, inter alia on 
grounds of sex, has a provision which permits the state to make special provision for 
women and children, which would not be violative of the Constitution.  It is 
interesting to study how at times this provision has been used by the states.  The 
Railway Department wishing to increase the employment opportunities of women 
workers, decided to reserve all posts as railway enquiry and reservation clerks for 
women employees.  One of the justifications for this step was that “this would reduce 
mal-practices for in the social conditions obtaining at present in the country women 
were less susceptible to improper influences”.  The rule was challenged in the Delhi 
High Court as being discriminatory to man employees.  The paternalistic attitude of 
the Court comes out clearly when it upheld the reservation as a “form of 
compensation to women who were backward and are greatly unrepresented in the 
railways”.17  To justify their stand they relied on statistics to prove that women 
employees occupied only 5% of the jobs and were totally excluded in 19 out of 30 
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posts.  They therefore felt that it was the duty of Court  “to redress the imbalance 
between men and women”.  In view of this paternalistic concern for women 
employees it appears churlish to criticise the Court but facts and figures produced 
before the Calcutta redressing the imbalance between men and women employees.  
Before the Calcutta High Court where the reservation was also challenged, the 
figures given show that little benefit will came to the women.  “It is unthinkable that 
such a step was taken to cause benefit to the women when only about 620 posts are 
involved...  and there are several lakhs of other posts ... have been left untouched”. 
18
   
 
After the Constitution had been adopted by the Constituent Assembly, the 
Parliament, like most colonial countries relied heavily on legislation to bring about 
the principle of Justice, Social, Political and Economic proclaimed in the Preamble of 
the Constitution.  One area in which there was heavy reliance was in the area of 
family law.  Free India had inherited a system from the British, who had perpetuated 
the difference among the various communities by recognising different family laws to 
govern them.  The common element in all the family laws - Muslims, Hindus, 
Christian, Parsis - was that the women had a subordinate position in comparison to 
the man.  Equality of the sexes and there being no prohibition permissible on the 
ground of sex would have required these laws to be changed immediately.  But the 
policy makers in their wisdom continued these different family laws and deferred 
bringing about a uniform law which according to the solemn resolve of the people of 
India19  should have been based on Justice, Social, Political and Economic, Laws 
dealing with marriage, divorce, guardianship and inheritance therefore continued not 
only to be different among the communities but the subordinate position ofd the 
woman continued. 
 
The ostensible reason was that most communities claimed that their personal law 
was of divine origin and therefore changing them would hurt their sentiments unless 
they asked for it.  This reasoning however did not prevent the legislators from taking 
up Hindu law which too claimed to be of divine origin - for making not only necessary 
changes but also bringing about a uniform law to govern all Hindus.  Till the new 
Hindu code there were two major schools - Dayabhaga and Mitakshara and 
innumerable sub schools. 
 
The Dayabhaga school was predominantly in the East and Mitakshara in most other 
places.  Radical changes were brought in the marriage law making marriages 
monogamous for all and giving both men and women the right of divorce.  Similarly 
in adoption the restriction that girls could not be adopted nor could women adopt 
was changed giving women the right to adopt in their own right.  In the case of 
married couple in pre-Independent India it was the right of the husband only to adopt 
and the need to get the consent of the wife was not required.  This too was removed 
and the husband can no longer adopt without the consent of the wife. 
 
Interestingly enough when it came to inheritance and giving women equal rights, the 
government faced the severest opposition.  Platitudes of equality of sexes is one 
thing but translating them into reality is quite another thing.  Gandhiji had written 
“Man has always desired power.  Ownership of property gives this power”.  This 
came out clearly in the debates and finally in the law.  The positive gains in the 
Hindu Succession Act are that a wife, mother and daughter have been recognised 
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as class I heirs with the son and will get an equal share in the man’s property if he 
has not left a will.  The second welcome change is that a woman will be an absolute 
owner of whatever she inherits.  In pre-Independent India, under the Hindu law, a 
woman had only a life interest and therefore was never able to alienate the property 
like sell it or gift it unless there was really a legal necessity.  Since the Hindu 
Succession Act she holds the property as an absolute owner.  But Gandhiji’s views 
about man’s power through property comes out clearly where joint, family property is 
concerned.  a son, grandson, or a great grandson gets a share in the joint family 
property from birth and the share is the same as that of the head of the family.  They 
are known as coparceners.  The orthodox Hindu view prevailed and women were not     
being coparceners and therefore, had no rights over the joint family property.  The 
only gesture that was made, after prolonged discussion and debate, was that in the 
event of the father’s death his share in the property would be divided equally among 
his class I heirs.  this therefore means that a son gets a share in two distinct 
capacities - one as his father’s son and the other in his own right.  Recently two 
states - Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu have amended their inheritance laws to 
abolish the orthodox copercenary and given daughters the same right as sons in the 
joint family property.  This will man that atleast in these two states, there will be no 
discrimination between the rights of sons and of daughters governed by Hindu law. 
 
The other concession made to the traditionalists which is really to be deplored is that 
daughters have only the right of residence in the dwelling house of the family and 
that too if the daughter is unmarried, widowed or separated.  A married daughter has 
no right and a daughter seeking to leave her in-laws and her husband because of 
their harassment will not as of right be able to come and stay in her father’s house 
as she is not separated.  Refuge is denied to her altogether.  In addition to this the 
daughters cannot ask for a partition to get a share.  Only if the male members 
decide to sell or partition dwelling house can the daughters claim their share. 
 
In addition to the legal provisions perpetuating the unequal position of sons and 
daughters, ignorance of her legal rights coupled with the social factor of instilling in 
her that claims should not be made against her brothers has resulted in the benefits 
of the Hindu Succession Act remaining mainly on paper .  Only the middle class 
educated woman is aware of her rights and occasionally claims them.  The 
argument is often advanced that only a microscopic minority has property to leave 
for the heirs.  While there is such force in this argument, the provision preventing a 
married daughter from seeking shelter in her natal home, surely needs to be 
remedied.  Whatever the income level of the family may be, harassment and cruelty 
to women is not confined to any income group but is almost all pervasive, therefore 
this discrimination continuing needs to be remedied immediately - if we are not to 
make a mockery of Justice-Social,  Political and Economic   promised to women 
of India. 
 
Another branch of law ironically applicable to women of all communities, is the one 
giving the mother a subordinate position  to the father in the right of guardianship. 
Even today the father continues to be the natural guardian and the mother’s claim 
comes only after him.  Fortunately the role of the judiciary has been very helpful in 
many cases and the mother has been given custody and guardianship on the 
principle that the welfare of the minor should predominate and not the principle of 
natural guardianship.  The welfare of the child must be the guiding principle and the 
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fact that the father is the earning member should not determine this very important 
question of guardianship as used to be the case at one time.  But the statutory law 
continues to emphasize the father’s right.  If these glaring discrepancies continue in 
post-Independent legislation (Hindu Law of Guardianship)  framed by the same 
legislators who proclaimed equality of sexes and regarded this to be guiding 
principle of the Constitution, then one can only hazard a guess about the legal rights 
of other communities which the legislators have not cared so far to touch.  The 
second report of the Legal Aid Committee mentioned clearly that “family law in the 
various regional and religious communities in the country shows glaring 
discrimination between the sexes. there is no good reason for the perpetual survival 
of this apparent injustice”.  More recently in such Bano’s 20 case the highest court of 
the land - the Supreme Court - has regretted that “there is no evidence of any official 
activity for framing a common civil code even though a common code will help the 
cause of national integration by removing disparate loyalties to laws which have 
conflicting ideologies”.  They reminded the Government that Art.  44 which lays 
down that “the State shall endeavour to secure for the citizen a uniform civil code 
throughout the territory of India was the responsibility of the state which is really 
charged with the duty of securing a uniform civil code.” 
 
Another very important area affecting the status of women, is  removing the 
discrimination which stands in the way of her full participation in the economic 
process.  The constitution states that there shall be no discrimination between men 
and women in opportunities for employment.  But what is the position after all these 
years?  The draft Six Year Plan recorded that the “labour market as it is operating is 
not neutral as between men and women”  and there are sectoral imbalances in the 
opportunities available for women for regular employment training and promotion”.  
In addition to these imbalances and unequal opportunities, discrimination continues 
even in the Government departments and public sector enterprises. 
 
Our senior most woman ambassador had to go to court to protest not only against 
her being denied promotion but also against the discriminatory rules governing 
women officers.  One of the rules was that no married woman shall be entitled as of 
right to be appointed to the service.  When challenged in Court, Justice Krishna Iyer 
said “the first blush this rule is in defiance of Art. 16 ...  The misogynous posture is a 
hang-over of the masculine culture of manacling the weaker sex forgetting how our 
struggle for national freedom was also a battle against women’s thralldom”.  The 
other rule which fall into the same category was “at any time after the marriage, a 
woman member of the service may be required to resign from the service, if the 
Government is satisfied that her family and domestic commitments are likely to 
come in the way of the due and efficient discharge of her duties....”  The learned 
Judge stated clearly that “discrimination against women, in traumatic transparency is 
found in this rule ...  If the family and domestic commitments of woman members of 
the service are likely to come in the way of efficient discharge of duties, a similar 
situation may well arise in the case of a male member....”  Fortunately the challenge 
of the rules in the Supreme Court compelled the Government to withdraw the two 
offending rules21 and also promote the petitioner, C.B. Muthamma, holding that “she 
was meritorious enough for promotion”. 
 
Two Government corporations - Indian Airlines and Air India - had continued 
discriminatory rules governing the service conditions of air hostesses compared to 
 7 
those of flight stewards, who were doing more or less the same work during a flight.  
The discontent of the air-hostesses had led the corporation to refer their cases to 
two Tribunals earlier but their pay, promotional avenues and the age of retirement 
continued to be different though a slight improvement was made in their age of 
retirement.  In addition to the awards of the two tribunals, the Government to remove 
all doubts about violating the Equal Remuneration Act 1976 by having two different 
scales of pay issued a notification in 1979 where they clearly laid down that they are 
“satisfied that the difference in regard to pay etc.  of these two categories of 
employees are based on different conditions of service and not on difference of sex”.  
But the retirement age was increased from 30 years to 35 years. 
 
Dissatisfied with their differentiated status, a number of hostesses filed a writ petition 
in the Supreme Court 22  alleging that fundamental rights of equality and equality of 
opportunity were being violated.  According to the regulation governing the age of 
retirement flight stewards retired at 58 years while an air hostess retired “upon 
attaining the age of 35 years or on marriage, if it takes place within four years of 
service or on first pregnancy, whichever occurs earlier”.  The counsel for the air 
hostesses argued that even though they were doing identical duties, the air-
hostesses had been ‘particularly selected for hostile discrimination by the 
Corporation mainly on the ground of sex...  (this) was a clear infraction of the 
provisions of Art. 15 (1) and Art. 16 which prohibit discrimination inter alia on 
grounds of sex and equality of opportunity in matters of public employment”.  In 
addition to this violation he argued that “the rule requiring on air hostess to retire on 
the ground of pregnancy or marriage within four years is manifestly unreasonable... 
and violative of Art. 14”  which guarantees equality before law. 
 
The Supreme Court had no difficulty in declaring that flight stewards and air 
hostesses did not belong to the same class as “the basic requirements for entry into 
the service are absolutely different “ and there was material difference both in 
respect of qualification and starting salaries, thus disposing of the point that there 
was discrimination between the two categories of employees though it recognised 
that “both the classes may during the flight work as a cabin crew”. 
 
The judgement then examined the other condition regarding the rule about 
retirement to decide whether they were “entirely unreasonable and arbitrary”.  In 
dealing with the condition of marriage within four years necessitating retirement, the 
Court opined that it was a desirable rule as it was “by all standards a very sound and 
salutary provision.  Apart from improving the health of the employee, it helps a good 
deal in the promotion and boosting up of our family planning programme”.  In the 
Court’s view when a woman marries around 20 or 23 “she becomes mature and 
there is every change of such a marriage proving a success ... The third reason 
accepted by the Court was that “the Corporation will have to incur huge expenditure 
in recruiting additional air hostesses either on a temporary or on ad hoc basis to 
replace the working air hostesses if they conceive....” 
 
Regarding condition of termination of the services of an air hostess on her becoming 
pregnant, the Court took the view that it was extremely unreasonable and “this 
provision shocks the conscience of the Court”.  They further added that they were 
“constrained to observe that such course of action is extremely detestable  and 
abhorrent to the notions of a civilised society.  Apart from being grossly unethical, it 
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smacks of a deep rooted sense of utter selfishness at the cost of all human values”.  
Fortunately the conscience of the Court found it difficult to accept this condition and 
unhesitatingly held it to be violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution.  Fortunately taking 
this view they did not allow the Government policy of family planning to be the 
guiding principle but followed the Constitutional mandate. 
 
Another regulation struck down by the Court, in its existing form was one which laid 
down that while normally an air hostess retired at 35 years, her services could at the 
option of the Managing Director be extended to 45.  This option given to the 
Managing Director in the view of the Court “may result in discrimination”  as he might 
exercise it in favour of some women and not in favour of others.  Therefore the Court 
ruled that “unless the provision is suitably amended to bring it in conformity with the 
provisions of Article 14 (air hostesses) would continue to retire at the age of 45 
years”. 
 
Another case when the state government seemed oblivious of the Constitutional 
guarantee of equal opportunity for women and no discrimination on the basis of sex 
was remedied by the judiciary.  In this case the Kerala Government had refused to 
appoint two women, who had not only been called for interview but who had been 
selected by the State Public Service Commission.  The ostensible reason given by 
the Government department in refusing to appoint them in spite of their selection 
was that they could not ride a cycle.  The High Court not only directed that the next 
two vacancies should be given to these two women but also pointed out that in the 
selections that had been made there were a number of other candidates (all male) 
who also could not cycle.  They ended their judgement by holding the action of the 
Government department to be “irrational, unjust and unfair.  It militated against the 
principle of equality”. 
 
The rules and regulations often laid down by state governments bring out clearly the 
patriarchal values still being pursued and militating against the principle of equality of 
sexes.  In an interesting case where a training course was being run by the 
Government, the Civil Surgeon had advertised for the training course for midwifery 
but added that in the case of married women applying, the consent of the husband 
had to be sent along with the application.  The candidate, who had been extremely 
anxious to apply got her husband’s consent.  But the husband had second thoughts 
and withdrew the consent letter.  The reason he gave was that her absence “would 
disturb the family life and hence she should not be permitted to join”.  Dutifully the 
Department withheld her candidature asking her to get a “no objection”  letter from 
her husband as the first stood cancelled by his letter sent subsequently.  She went 
to court and got an interim order to stop cancellation of her training for which she 
had already been selected.  She challenged the stand of the Department and their 
rule as being “wholly unreasonable and discriminatory, being violative of the right of 
equality enshrined in the Constitution”.  The Department argued that if she joined 
without the consent of the husband it might affect the wife and not only her family 
but also the training.  The court rejected the argument holding that it was a purely 
personal matter between husband and wife and because “of these possibilities a 
valuable right to got employment can not be denied”. 
 
The cases show that the Judiciary has not been consistent in upholding the 
fundamental right of equality of the sexes or the right to equal opportunity but on the 
 9 
whole in most cases when approached it has tried to uphold the right of the woman 
in this field.  But how many women faced with similar situations are bale to seek 
redress from the Court?  Constant vigilance is therefore required and the right of the 
aggrieved person to approach concerned organisations should be recognised and 
the organisations given locus standi to bring the complaint.  Otherwise the 
Constitutional right given to the women and which had been hailed by many will 
remain only on paper . 
                                                          
 
 
 
 
 
NOTES 
 
1
 . Young India Feb. 1918 
 
2
. “I am uncompromising in the matter of women’s rights.  In my opinion she should labour under 
no legal liability not suffered by man.  I should treat the daughters and sons on a footing of 
perfect equality”,  Gandhi Series to the Woman, Ed. Hingorani p. 12. 
 
3
. Harijan,  1934.  
 
4
 . “Many of the subjects dealt with ... relate to intimate details of personal life and to all manner 
of prejudices and customs.  It is right that these prejudices and injurious customs should go 
....  One has to approach the subject in a manner which is the least offensive to larger 
sections of people and which does not irritate them”,  Selected Workers of Jawaharlal 
Nehru - General Editor S.  Gopal, Vol. II, p. 284. 
 
5
 . “Many of them silently voted for the Karachi resolution might not have meant what the 
resolution laid down.  They might have had mental reservations ...  There are still many in this 
country who are opposed to freedom being given to women”, May 1936, Nehru addressing a 
women’s meeting. 
 
6
 . All citizens are equal before the law, irrespective of religion, caste, creed or sex. No disability 
attaches to any citizen by reason of his or her religion, caste, creed or sex - Karachi 
Resolution on Fundamental Rights, 1931. 
 
7
. 19th November 1948. 
  
8
. 24th November 1949. 
 
9
 . Ibid.  This was in response to the comment made by Rohini Kumar Chaudhuri.  “We really 
need protection against women because in every spheres of life they are now trying to elbow 
us out in the offices, in the legislatures, in the embassies, in everything they try to elbow us out 
... Now even after seats for women have been abolished, if the feelings of men are such that 
they should push them forward, I would very much regret it”.  22nd November 1949. 
 
10
 . Towards Equality, Government of India 1974, Table XIII on p. 165 gives details of differential 
in wages in Bihar,  Haryana, Madhya Pradesh, Punjab, Tamil Nadu and Uttar Pradesh. 
  
11
 . Ibid. para 5.96, p. 174. 
 
12
  V. Karkendeya v. State of A.P. 1989 S.C. 1308. 
 
13
  Randhir Singh, Union of India, 1982, S.C. 879 
 
14
  A.N. Rajamma v. State of Kerala 1983 Lab & I.C. 1388 
 10 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
15
  “Inspite of the ERA having been passed more than ten years ago, there are several employers 
who continue to pay lower wages to women... Inspite of the known prevalence of disparity in 
wages between men and women, there have not been many reports of violations of the Act”, 
Object and Reasons of An Act to amend Equal Remuneration Act 1976. 
 
16
 . Reported in The Telegraph, 24.4.89. 
 
 
17
 . 1979, Lab.  Ind. cases 889. 
 
18
. Naba K. Ray v. Union of India 1979 Lab. Ind. Cases 1226. 
  
19
 . Preamble of the Constitution which reads we the People of India, having solemnly resolved ... 
 
20
 . Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum 1985 (2) SCC 556 
 
21
 . C.B. Muthamma v. Union of India (1979) USCC. 260. 
 
22
 . Air India v. Nergesh Meerzo 1981 (4) SCC 335. 
 
 
